The summaries include excerpts from the Overview and from Part I on: the Archdiocese and Church authorities; knowledge of clerical child sex abuse; secrecy in canon law; cover-up; individual archbishops and bishops; psychiatric and psychological treatment; the Gardai; Conclusion
Overview of the Report
- There was a systematic and illegal cover-up clerical child abuse during the whole of the period studied by the commission (1975-2004), by four archbishops, with the result that abusers were typically recycled into other parishes;
- These four archbishops were aware of the criminal and deeply damaging nature of this abuse;
- Protection of the institution always came before the protection of children and the pastoral care of survivors;
- There was connivance at the highest level in the Irish police service, the Garda;
- Many children suffered unnecessarily as a consequence;
- Many auxiliary bishops of Dublin participated in this cover-up - some of whom subsequently became bishops of other Irish dioceses (Donal Murray, now bishop of Limerick and Jim Moriarty, now bishop of Kildare and Leighlin);
- The Vatican (the Congregation for the Doctrine of the faith) and the Papal nuncio to Ireland refused to help the commission of inquiry by providing copies of relevant documentation;
- Canon law as well as civil law was ignored - and there was no clear understanding of canon law, which is chaotic in any case;
- Many priests who knew of the abuse took no action;
- Communication between the archbishop, his auxiliary bishops and senior administrators, was chaotic, with no clear demarcation of responsibility and no way of ensuring that vital information about paedophiles with those responsible for parish assignments;
- Archbishops were appointed for their doctrinal compliance with Rome, not for their managerial expertise;
- In cases where priests were sent for psychiatric evaluation, psychiatrists were sometimes not given full details on their misbehaviour. This sometimes resulted in such priests being deemed fit to return to ministry where they abused again.
Excerpts from Part I of the Report
The Archdiocese and Church Authorities (back to top)
1.14 -- The volume of revelations of child sexual abuse by clergy over the past 35 years or so has been described by a Church source as a “tsunami” of sexual abuse. He went on to describe the “tsunami” as “an earthquake deep beneath the surface hidden from view.” The clear implication of that statement is that the Church, in common with the general public, was somehow taken by surprise by the volume of the revelations. Officials of the Archdiocese of Dublin and other Church authorities have repeatedly claimed to have been, prior to the late 1990s, on „a learning curve‟ in relation to the matter. Having completed its investigation, the Commission does not accept the truth of such claims and assertions.
1.15 -- The Dublin Archdiocese's pre‑occupations in dealing with cases of child sexual abuse, at least until the mid 1990s, were the maintenance of secrecy, the avoidance of scandal, the protection of the reputation of the Church, and the preservation of its assets. All other considerations, including the welfare of children and justice for victims, were subordinated to these priorities. The Archdiocese did not implement its own canon law rules and did its best to avoid any application of the law of the State.
Knowledge of Clerical Child Sex Abuse (back to top)
1.17 -- The authorities in the Archdiocese of Dublin and the religious orders who were dealing with complaints of child sexual abuse were all very well educated people. Many had qualifications in canon law and quite a few also had qualifications in civil law. This makes their claims of ignorance very difficult to accept. Child sexual abuse did not start in the 20th century. Since time immemorial it has been a “delict” under canon law, a sin in ordinary religious terms and a crime in the law of the State. Ignorance of the law is not a defence under the law of the State. It is difficult for the Commission to accept that ignorance of either the canon law or the civil law can be a defence for officials of the Church.
1.18 -- There is a two thousand year history of Biblical, Papal and Holy See statements showing awareness of clerical child sex abuse. Over the centuries, strong denunciation of clerical child sexual abuse came from Popes, Church councils and other Church sources. A list covering the period 153 AD to 2001 is included in an article by the Promoter of Justice in the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. These denunciations are particularly strong on offences against nature and offences committed with or against juveniles. The 1917 code of canon law decreed deprivation of office and/or benefice, or expulsion from the clerical state for such offences. In the 20th century two separate documents on dealing with child sexual abuse were promulgated by Vatican authorities (see Chapter 4) but little observed in Dublin.
1.19 The controversy and drama surrounding the Fr Brendan Smyth case in 1994 (see Chapter 7) brought clerical child sexual abuse to public attention. It is probable that this was the first time that many members of the public became aware of the possibility of clerical child sexual abuse. The claim that bishops and senior church officials were on a learning curve about child sexual abuse rings hollow when it is clear that cases were dealt with by Archbishop McQuaid in the 1950s and 1960s and that, although the majority of complaints emerged from 1995 onwards, many of the complaints described in this report first came to the attention of the Archdiocese in the 1970s and 1980s. The Commission examined complaints in respect of approximately 320 complainants against the 46 priests in the representative sample. Of the complaints examined by the Commission,
- 3 were made in the 1960s;
- 11 were made in the 1970s and there were two suspicions/concerns;
- 64 were made in the 1980s and there were 24 suspicions/concerns;
- 135 were made in the 1990s and there were 23 suspicions/concerns;
- 112 were made in the 2000s (mainly between January 2000 and 1 May 2004) and there were 10 suspicions/concerns.
1.21 -- All the Archbishops of Dublin in the period covered by the Commission were aware of some complaints. This is true of many of the auxiliary bishops also. At the time the Archdiocese took out insurance in 1987, Archbishop Kevin McNamara, Archbishop Dermot Ryan and Archbishop John Charles McQuaid had had, between them, available information on complaints against at least 17 priests operating under the aegis of the Dublin Archdiocese. The taking out of insurance was an act proving knowledge of child sexual abuse as a potential major cost to the Archdiocese and is inconsistent with the view that Archdiocesan officials were still "on a learning curve‟ at a much later date, or were lacking in an appreciation of the phenomenon of clerical child sex abuse.
1.24 -- Some priests were aware that particular instances of abuse had occurred. A few were courageous and brought complaints to the attention of their superiors. The vast majority simply chose to turn a blind eye. The cases show that several instances of suspicion were never acted upon until inquiries were made. Some priest witnesses admitted to the Commission that they had heard various reports on the grapevine.
1.25 -- The Church authorities failed to implement most of their own canon law rules on dealing with clerical child sexual abuse. This was in spite of the fact that a number of them were qualified canon and civil lawyers. As is shown in Chapter 4, canon law appears to have fallen into disuse and disrespect during the mid 20th century. In particular, there was little or no experience of operating the penal (that is, the criminal) provisions of that law. The collapse of respect for the canon law in Archdiocesan circles is covered in some detail in Chapter 4. For many years offenders were neither prosecuted nor made accountable within the Church. Archbishop McQuaid was well aware of the canon law requirements and even set the processes in motion but did not complete them. Archbishops Ryan and McNamara do not seem to have ever applied the canon law.
Secrecy in Canon Law (back to top)
1.27 -- Most officials in the Archdiocese were, however, greatly exercised by the provisions of canon law which deal with secrecy. It was often spoken of as a reason for not informing the Gardaí about known criminal offences.
1.30 -- The Commission is satisfied that Church law demanded serious penalties for clerics who abused children. In Dublin from the 1970s onwards this was ignored; the highest priority was the protection of the reputation of the institution and the reputation of priests. The moving around of offending clerics with little or no disclosure of their past is illustrative of this.
1.31 -- The American phrase "don't ask, don't tell" is appropriate to describe the attitude of the Dublin Archdiocese to clerical sex abuse for most of the period covered by the report. The problem as a whole never seems to have been discussed openly by the Archbishop and his auxiliaries, at least until the 1990s. Complainants were told as little as possible. The note "Gain his knowledge, tell him nothing" for dealing with complainants and witnesses, discussed in Chapter 4, typifies the attitudes of the Archdiocese.
1.32 -- Another consequence of the obsessive concern with secrecy and the avoidance of scandal was the failure of successive Archbishops and bishops to report complaints to the Gardaí prior to 1996. The Archbishops, bishops and other officials cannot claim that they did not know that child sexual abuse was a crime. As citizens of the State, they have the same obligations as all other citizens to uphold the law and report serious crimes to the authorities.
1.33 -- Complainants, too, were required by canon law to observe secrecy in their dealings with the Church. In late 1995, the Archdiocese gave the Gardaí the names of 17 priests against whom complaints had been made. The Framework Document provided for the reporting of all complaints. It is clear that Archbishop Connell remained troubled by the requirement of secrecy. In 2002, he allowed the Gardaí access to the archdiocesan files. The decision to do that, he told the Commission, "created the greatest crisis in my position as Archbishop. because he considered it conflicted with his duty as a bishop, to his priests. When asked why, he explained:
"Was I betraying my consecration oath in rendering the files accessible to the guards? I think you've got to remember, and this is something that you may not have reflected on, you've got to remember that confidentiality is absolutely essential to the working of the bishop because if people cannot have confidence that he will keep information that they give him confidential, they won't come to him. And the same is true of priests."
1.35 -- As can be seen clearly from the case histories, there is no doubt that the reaction of Church authorities to reports of clerical child sexual abuse in the early years of the Commission.s remit was to ensure that as few people as possible knew of the individual priest's problem. There was little or no concern for the welfare of the abused child or for the welfare of other children who might come into contact with the priest. Complainants were often met with denial, arrogance and cover‑up and with incompetence and incomprehension in some cases. Suspicions were rarely acted on. Typically complainants were not told that other instances of child sexual abuse by their abuser had been proved or admitted. The attitude to individual complainants was overbearing and in some cases underhand (see Chapter 58).
Individual Archbishops and Bishops (back to top)
1.36 -- All the Archbishops and many of the auxiliary bishops in the period covered by the Commission handled child sexual abuse complaints badly. During the period under review, there were four Archbishops – Archbishops McQuaid, Ryan, McNamara and Connell. Not one of them reported his knowledge of child sexual abuse to the Gardaí throughout the 1960s, 1970s, or 1980s. It was not until November 1995 that Archbishop Connell allowed the names of 17 priests about whom the Archdiocese had received complaints to be given to the Gardaí. This figure was not complete. At that time there was knowledge within the Archdiocese of at least 28 priests against whom there had been complaints.
1.47 -- A number of auxiliary bishops were made aware of complaints of child sexual abuse by priests in their geographical areas. Others found out about such priests through the regular monthly meetings involving the Archbishop and the auxiliaries. One of the principal tasks of the auxiliary bishops was the assignment of priests to parishes, subject to final approval by the Archbishop. In the Dublin Archdiocese priests were reassigned approximately every five years. The evidence shows that these appointments were often made without any reference to child sexual abuse issues. The auxiliary bishops who dealt particularly badly with complaints were Bishops O'Mahony and Kavanagh. Bishop Murray also dealt badly with a number of complaints. (A full list of auxiliary bishops is given in Chapter 11.)
1.49 -- Bishop O'Mahony's handling of complaints and suspicions of child sexual abuse was particularly bad. He is one of the longest serving auxiliary bishops of Dublin (from 1975 to 1996). The Commission has established that he was aware of 13 priests from within the representative sample (and a number of others) against whom there had been allegations/suspicions by 1995. The full details of his involvement are detailed in the chapters on individual priests. As chancellor (he was a bishop while he was the chancellor), he dealt with one complaint and he did not inform the Archbishop about it. When he ceased to be chancellor, he failed to tell Archbishop Ryan about a number of complaints, for example, the complaint relating to Fr Vidal* on whose behalf he gave a reference to the diocese of Sacramento in California without giving details of his past history (see Chapter 15).
Psychiatric and Psychological Treatment (back to top)
1.70 -- In the 1960s and 1970s, priests were sent for assessment to a number of psychiatrists and psychologists. In the 1980s the Archdiocese began to realise that priests who had committed child sexual abuse needed lengthy treatment and therapy. Of the 46 priests in the representative sample, 12 received no form of treatment (five of these had already died when the complaint was made). Twenty five of the priests were assessed or treated by the Granada Institute (see Chapter 11) and eight attended Stroud (see Chapter 11). Some attended both facilities. A small number attended other assessment and/or treatment facilities. Some priests attended more than two therapeutic facilities.
1.71 -- The Commission is very concerned at the fact that, in some cases, full information was not given to the professionals or the treatment facility about the priest‟s history. This inevitably resulted in useless reports. Nevertheless, these reports were sometimes used as an excuse to allow priests back to unsupervised ministry.
State Authorities: The Gardai (back to top)
1.92 -- There were a number of inappropriate contacts between the Gardaí and the Archdiocese. Clearly the handing over of the Fr. Edmondus* case to Archbishop McQuaid by Commissioner Costigan was totally inappropriate. The relationship between some senior Gardaí and some priests and bishops was also inappropriate – in particular, in the Fr Carney and Fr cases.
1.93 -- A number of very senior members of the Gardaí, including the Commissioner in 1960, clearly regarded priests as being outside their remit. There are some examples of Gardaí actually reporting complaints to the Archdiocese instead of investigating them. It is fortunate that some junior members of the force did not take the same view.
1.105 -- The Commission has been impressed by the extraordinary charity shown by complainants and their families towards offenders. It is very clear to the Commission that complainants and their families frequently behaved in a much more Christian and charitable way than the Church authorities did. Many indeed expressed concern for the welfare of the priest concerned.
1.110 -- The conclusion reached by the Attorney General in Massachusetts was that:
“The widespread sexual abuse of children in the Archdiocese of Boston was due to an institutional acceptance of abuse and a massive and pervasive failure of leadership. For at least six decades, three successive Archbishops, Bishops and others in positions of authority within the Archdiocese operated with tragically misguided priorities. They chose to protect the image and reputation of their institution rather than the safety and well being of the children entrusted to their care. They acted with misguided devotion to secrecy."
1.111 -- Unfortunately the same conclusion could be reached about the Archdiocese of Dublin up until the adoption of the Framework Document in 1996. While proper support structures were not put in place for victims until much later the Archdiocese began to report complaints received after January 1996 to the Gardai authorities.
1.113 -- The Commission has no doubt that clerical child sexual abuse was covered up by the Archdiocese of Dublin and other Church authorities over much of the period covered by the Commission's remit. The structures and rules of the Catholic Church facilitated that cover-up. The State authorities facilitated the cover up by not fulfilling their responsibilities to ensure that the law was applied equally to all and allowing the Church institutions to be beyond the reach of the normal law enforcement processes. The welfare of children, which should have been the first priority, was not even a factor to be considered in the early stages. Instead the focus was on the avoidance of scandal and the preservation of the good name, status and assets of the institution and of what the institution regarded as its most important members – the priests. In the mid 1990s, a light began to be shone on the scandal and the cover up. Gradually, the story has unfolded. It is the responsibility of the State to ensure that no similar institutional immunity is ever allowed to occur again. This can be ensured only if all institutions are open to scrutiny and not accorded an exempted status by any organs of the State.